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Abstract
One remarkable aspect of human cognition is our ability to reason about physical events. This
paper provides novel evidence that intuitive physics is subject to a peculiar error, the classic
conjunction fallacy, where people rate the probability of a conjunction of two events as more
likely than one constituent (a logical impossibility). Participants viewed videos of physical
scenarios and judged the probability that either a single event or a conjunction of two events
would occur. In Experiment 1 (n = 60), participants consistently rated conjunction events
as more likely than single events for the same scenes. Experiment 2 (n = 180) extends these
results to rule out several alternative explanations. Experiment 3 (n = 100) generalizes the
finding to different scenes. This demonstration of conjunction errors contradicts claims that
such errors shouldn’t appear in intuitive physics and presents a serious challenge to current
theories of mental simulation in physical reasoning.
1 Introduction
Successful interaction with our environment often requires us to estimate the likelihood of particular
physical events. For example, when deciding whether to walk through a construction site, we might
gauge the chance of being injured by a falling piece of scaffolding. Accurately assessing the risk
requires us to estimate the probability that certain physical events might occur in the future (e.g.,
a bolt might come loose). Frequently, we might also need to judge the probabilities of occurrence
of conjunctions of several events (e.g., a support tube bends and a bolt comes loose).
There are good reasons to expect that estimates of probabilities in everyday physical situations
should be well calibrated and internally consistent. In contemporary simulation theories of physi-
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cal reasoning (Battaglia, Hamrick, & Tenenbaum, 2013; Ullman, Spelke, Battaglia, & Tenenbaum,
2017) the probability of physical events is argued to be estimated by sampling from noisy simu-
lations consistent with the known state of affairs. A key consequence of this claim is that these
estimates should satisfy the constraints of probability theory contingent on the samples them-
selves. Finally, a growing body of experiments suggest that humans, even pre-verbal infants, are
sometimes capable of probabilistic reasoning about physical situations (Téglás et al., 2011; Xu &
Denison, 2009; Xu & Garcia, 2008).
Further, there are reasons to expect physical reasoning to be different than other forms of rea-
soning. Every one of our ancestors had to navigate the same physical world; the parameters are
exceptionally stable; correct physical reasoning is particularly valuable in evolutionary terms. For
these and other reasons, philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that intuitive physics will
be unlike other forms of commonsense reasoning. Based in part on results with infants, Strevens
(2013) specifically conjectured that the well-known flaws people demonstrate in probabilistic rea-
soning (cf., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) appear only in dealing with subjective likelihoods
(“epistemic probabilities”) and not in dealing with physical probability. Recent work (Firestone
& Scholl, 2016, 2017) has argued that intuitive physics is similar to low-level, automatic percep-
tual processes. The aim of this report is to document and report a novel error in reasoning that
represents a challenge to this view.
1.1 The Conjunction Fallacy
If a reasoner estimates the probability of physical event A (e.g., a bolt comes loose on some
scaffolding) as P (A) and the probability of physical event B (e.g., a support tube bends) as P (B),
logically the probability of both events occurring must be equal to or lower than that of either
component occurring (i.e., P (A∧B) ≤ P (A) or P (B)). However, decades of research has revealed
that for many described scenarios, people tend to rate a conjunction as more likely than one or both
of its constituents (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982, 1983), a reasoning error known as the conjunction
fallacy.
The classic paper first reporting the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982) included
evaluations of a woman named Linda who fit the description of a progressive (e.g., Linda was
described as concerned with social justice and in opposition to nuclear weapons). Based on this
description, participants responded that Linda was more likely to be a feminist than to be a bank
teller. Surprisingly, 85% of participants also rated “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the
feminist movement” as more likely than “Linda is a bank teller”, a logical impossibility. A common
explanation of this error is that the conjunction statement mentions a “representative” trait or
event (being a feminist) which is rated as highly probable on its own, whereas the single trait
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(being a bank teller) seems less representative of the evoked stereotype.
The conjunction fallacy has been explored in numerous subsequent papers. For example, Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1983) tested several variations on the Linda problem. This included replica-
tions with both between- and within-subject designs and tests on populations with different levels of
statistical skill (including undergraduates, medical students, and decision science Ph.D. students),
with all variations confirming the original result. The conjunction fallacy has, of course, received
a great deal of theoretical and empirical scrutiny since its introduction (Fiedler, 1988; Gigerenzer,
1991; Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999), much of the scrutiny focusing on concerns around pragmatics.
However, rigorous empirical work has provided continued support for the finding and its status as
a genuine reasoning fallacy (Bonini, Tentori, & Osherson, 2004; Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale,
2002; Tentori & Crupi, 2012).
1.2 Reasoning about Conjunctions of Physical Events
The conjunction fallacy has been examined with a range of different materials, including judg-
ments of the traits of individuals, estimations of the likelihood of natural disasters, predictions
about federal legislation, and medical diagnoses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Despite this, to our
knowledge it has never been documented in the domain of physical reasoning.
The potential existence of a conjunction fallacy in the domain of physical reasoning poses serious
problems for theoretical accounts of physical reasoning based on mental simulation (Battaglia
et al., 2013; Ullman et al., 2017). In these models, predictions about the likelihood of various
events depend on examining one or more outcomes of a mental simulation which maintains an
approximate isomorphism to the physical dynamics of the actual world, similar to the way video
games approximate real physical dynamics. To estimate if a tower of blocks will fall over, such
theories argue that reasoners form an approximate mental representation of the configuration of
each block in the tower, run forward a number of mental simulations each from a slightly different
starting point (owing to sources of perceptual uncertainty about the precise configuration of the
starting state of the simulation), and make final judgments by aggregating over the results of these
simulations.
Probabilities estimated using this type of Monte Carlo simulation necessarily conform to the
axioms of probability theory. For example, the frequency with which A and B both occur in
different randomly initialized simulations must be less than or equal to the frequency of either
event occurring alone across those simulations. There is no way for A & B to occur without A
occurring as well, meaning judgments made using relative counts across a sample of simulations
to estimate probabilities will always avoid the conjunction fallacy. This consistency with the laws
of probability is a key virtue of the simulation approach, enabling sophisticated forms of inductive
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inference (Ullman et al., 2017). Thus, irrespective of accuracy, these theories predict that there
should be no systematic violation of the axioms of probability in subjective judgements about
common physical scenarios.
Often it is assumed that the classical theory of probability is the correct method of representa-
tion, but there are other theories of probability. A body of recent work has suggested that cognitive
models of judgments may be better fit by the more general quantum probability framework (Pothos
& Busemeyer, 2013; Pothos, Busemeyer, Shiffrin, & Yearsley, 2017). These data may be revealing
to this debate as well.
2 Experiment 1
To evaluate the possibility of a conjunction fallacy in the domain of physical prediction, we em-
ployed a within-subjects design in which each participant viewed a number of clips showing simple
physical scenes in a 2-D world. Participants viewed the first few seconds of each scene and rated the
probability of a future event occurring if the scene were to continue (e.g., “What is the probability
the ball will fall in the hole?”). Rating the probability of specific future events is a common task
that has been used in many recent papers on intuitive physical reasoning (Battaglia et al., 2013;
Hamrick, Battaglia, Griffiths, & Tenenbaum, 2016; Hamrick, Smith, Griffiths, & Vul, 2015).
Each critical scene appeared twice, but participants were not informed of this fact. For these
eight critical scenes, participants rated a conjunction event P (A ∧B) on one appearance and one
constituent event P (A) on the other. If participants rate the conjunction probability as more likely
than the constituent probability, this is a form of the conjunction fallacy.1
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
We recruited 90 participants (28 female, mean age = 33.6, SD = 9.8) on Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk. Of these participants, 74 were able to answer basic comprehension questions about the task,
given three attempts. Following the exclusion criteria (outlined below), 62 participants were eligible
for our analysis. We analyzed only the first 60 participants (18 female, mean age = 34.2, SD =
9.7), as stated in our preregistration (here). Pilot testing of the materials suggested a robust effect
even at small sample sizes; based on the pilot data, we chose this sample size to provide high power
(> .95) to detect the effect.
1A limited account of the results of Experiment 1 was previously published as a conference paper (Ludwin-Peery,
Bramley, Davis, & Gureckis, 2019).
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Figure 1: An annotated example of a scene as it appeared to participants. Dotted arrows indicate
approximate motion over the 2/3 second movie clip. The grey circle was described as a “cannonball”
and the pink circle as a “sphere”. Each scene appeared twice, once with the constituent question,
“How likely is it that the pink sphere will end up on the GRASS?” and once with the conjunction
question, “How likely is it that the cannonball will hit the pink sphere, and then the pink sphere
will end up on the GRASS?”
2.1.2 Materials and Procedure
Upon accepting the survey and consenting to participate, participants read a detailed description
of the task. This included several example videos of the physics engine we used2 and example clips
like those that appeared in the main body of the survey. These examples included many forms of
inter-object interactions, including collisions, and participants were allowed to watch these videos as
many times as they wanted. Participants were informed of the nature of the clips and we explained
how we wanted them to report their estimates of likelihood.
Participants then answered seven simple comprehension questions about the task, and were
given three attempts to do so. If they were able to answer these questions correctly, they moved
on to the rest of the study.
In the main body of the study, participants saw several scenes in which a pink “sphere” fell
above a hole in a grassy field, and a gray “cannonball” traveled across the scene in such a way that
it could potentially collide with the pink sphere (Figure 1). One object was called a cannonball and
the other a sphere so that participants would be less likely to confuse them based on the written
description. Pilot testing indicated that calling both objects by the same name caused confusion.
2The PhysX physics engine, through the Unity interface (Unity, 2005).
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The scenes differed in several minor ways as well, including the exact speed and position of
the objects, the size of the hole, and the presence or absence of one or more boxes on the grass.
Each video stopped after approximately 700 ms, well before the cannonball could possibly intersect
with the pink sphere’s path, leaving ambiguity about the outcome of the scene. For each scene,
participants were asked to estimate the likelihood of a particular outcome, and express that estimate
as a percentage chance.
Eight of the scenes were critical scenes, the answers to which provided our primary measure.
Each critical scene appeared twice, but participants were not informed of this fact. Half of the
scenes that appeared twice were mirrored horizontally in their second appearance. For each scene
that appeared twice, in one appearance participants were asked the question, “How likely is it
that the pink sphere will end up on the GRASS?”3 and in the other, “How likely is it that the
cannonball will hit the pink sphere, and then the pink sphere will end up on the GRASS?” Scenes
did not repeat until after several filler scenes were presented and completed. All video materials
are available on the OSF.
For the filler scenes, participants were asked questions unrelated to the outcomes of interest
used in the critical trials, such as the likelihood that the cannonball might end up in one of the
boxes or in the hole. Pilot data indicated that separation by a few filler scenes was sufficient to
prevent participants from explicitly recognizing the repetition.
Following the completion of the main body of the study, participants were asked to describe
how they answered the questions in the main task using the following prompt: “Roughly speaking,
how did you try to solve the problems? Please tell us a little about your approach below.” We also
asked several open-ended questions intended to determine whether or not participants had noticed
that some of the scenes appeared twice with different questions. Finally, participants answered
several demographic questions, gave free-response feedback, and were debriefed.
All data and materials are available on the OSF.
2.2 Results
The study included two questions with trivially obvious outcomes (e.g. the cannonball had already
missed the sphere and couldn’t possibly collide with it). When answering these questions, 12
(16%) reported that the near-certain outcome was less than 90% likely or that the near-impossible
outcome was more than 10% likely, and were not included in our analysis, as defined in our pre-
registration.
3Possible resting state locations were presented in all caps for clarity.
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Figure 2: Distribution of the average of the 8 difference scores for each participant. Solid vertical
line indicates the mean and dotted vertical lines indicate the upper and lower bounds of the 95%
confidence interval.
2.2.1 Primary Analyses
For each of the eight critical problems, subjects rated the probability of the conjunction and sole
statement. The mean judgment of the conjunction across all problems was 44.69% (SD = 25.88),
and the mean judgment of the sole event across all problems was 37.40% (SD = 26.58).
The difference between these two ratings form our primary data. We averaged the rating differ-
ence scores (δ = conjunction rating − sole rating) for each participant for each of the eight problems
(Figure 2). Positive values of δ indicate that participants rated conjunctions as more likely than
their constituent sole events, which is a form of the conjunction fallacy. Zero or negative scores
are not fallacious. The average δ value was +7.29% (SD = 13.07, SE = 1.69), which was reliably
greater than zero, according to both a two-tailed one-sample t-test, t(59) = 4.32, p < .001, and
a one-sample BEST, 95% Credible Interval: [4.06, 10.79]. The effect size was d = 0.56, 95% CI:
[0.28, 0.83]. Therefore, participants appear to have erroneously rated conjunctions as more likely
than their constituent sole events.
As shown in Figure 2, when averaging all critical trials together, 72% percent of the participants
rated the conjunctions as more likely than their constituents on average. In addition, 62% percent
of subjects rated the conjunction as more likely than the constituent on more than half of the
critical pairs. If participants were respecting the laws of probability in their estimations, subjects
would generally rate the conjunction as less or equally likely. We would certainly not expect to see
a consistent reversal.
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2.2.2 Secondary Analyses
In the post-experiment questionnaire, none of the participants reported noticing that some of the
videos appeared twice. In a follow-up question revealing that some of the videos appeared twice,
only seven participants claimed to notice. The questionnaire also asked participants to estimate
how many videos were repeated. While the true number of repeats was eight, only three participants
guessed close to this number. The majority of those who guessed said that only a small number (2
or 3) were repeated, though many participants declined to guess at all.
At the end of the study, we asked participants: “Roughly speaking, how did you try to solve
the problems? Please tell us a little about your approach below.”
Three coders who were had not been involved in the design or running of the study or the
collection of data were asked to code the free responses into four categories. The ratings had a
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.75, indicating acceptable agreement (Kline, 2013). A one-way, between-
subjects ANOVA found a significant effect, F (3, 56) = 3.900, p = 0.013, η2= .17, and a Bayesian
test produced a Bayes factor of 4:1 in favor of a difference by reported approach. However, as this
result failed to replicate in the higher-powered Experiment 2, we suggest that this result was a
false positive and do not draw any conclusions from it.
3 Experiment 2
Experiment 1 provides evidence that people commit the conjunction fallacy when reasoning about
simple physical scenarios. However, there is reason to be cautious in interpretation. Early criticisms
of conjunction fallacy results centered on the idea that participants might be interpreting the task in
line with conversational norms (Gigerenzer, 1991, 1996). People expect statements in conversation
to be informative, truthful, relevant, and clear (Grice, 1991), but it can be argued that conjunction
questions sometimes violate these expectations, leading participants to answer a slightly different
question than the one intended. Various empirical attempts have been made to demonstrate that
apparent conjunction fallacy errors are simply the result of participants reasonably misinterpreting
the materials (Dulany & Hilton, 1991; Fiedler, 1988; Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999; Mellers, Hertwig,
& Kahneman, 2001; Morier & Borgida, 1984), though even in the strictest tasks, the errors persist
(Sides et al., 2002; Tentori & Crupi, 2012).
Two alternative interpretations seem particularly of concern in Experiment 1. Mellers et al.
(2001) point out that, for example, “We invited friends and colleagues to the party” implies a
union of friends and colleagues, rather than an intersection. If participants are reading the question
quickly, they could potentially interpret P(A∧B) as something like P(A∨B) (i.e. “How likely is it
that the cannonball will hit the pink sphere or the pink sphere will end up on the grass or both
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events will occur?”).
Similarly, participants might interpret the conjunction as the conditional (“If the cannonball
hits the pink sphere, then how likely is it that the pink ball will end up on the GRASS?”). The
conditional being larger than one constituent is not a logical impossibility, and certainly not a form
of the conjunction fallacy.
To account for these classes of alternative interpretations, we ran a replication of Experiment
1 with additional conditions, allowing us to evaluate if alternative phrasings of the conjunction
question would lead to the same conjunction errors observed in Experiment 1.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
We collected 269 participants (98 female, mean age = 35.3, SD = 10.2) on Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk. Exclusion criteria were the same as in Experiment 1. We analyzed only the first 180 partic-
ipants (60 female, mean age = 36.2, SD = 10.2), as stated in a new preregistration (here). This
sample size was chosen so that each of the three conditions would have the same sample size as
Study 1, 60 participants after exclusions.
3.1.2 Materials and Procedure
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, save for the phrasing used in the appearances of
the conjunction question. We tested three different phrasings of the conjunction question, in three
between-subjects conditions. The first was the Original Phrasing condition, in which participants
saw the same phrasing that appeared in Experiment 1, namely:
Original: “How likely is it that the cannonball will hit the pink sphere, and then the pink
sphere will end up on the GRASS?”
We compared this to two alternative phrasings. The first was based on the original phrasing,
but omitted the connecting adverb “then”. As a result, we call this the No Adverb condition. The
comma was similarly omitted.
No Adverb: “How likely is it that the cannonball will hit the pink sphere and the pink
sphere will end up on the GRASS?”
The final condition was phrased to highlight the purely conjunctive nature of the question being
asked. No causal language was used, and the components were presented in the reverse of what
one would expect to be the natural order of events, so we call this the Disordered condition.
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Figure 3: Distribution of the average of the 8 difference scores for the participants in each group.
Included for comparison is the data from Study 1. Boxes correspond to the first and third quartiles.
Disordered: “How likely is it that both will happen: the pink sphere will end up on the
GRASS and the cannonball will hit the pink sphere?”
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. Whenever they saw a
conjunction question, they were given the appropriate phrasing by condition.
All data and materials are available on the OSF.
3.2 Results
The study included the same two trivially obvious questions as in Experiment 1. When answering
these questions, 36 participants reported that the near certain outcome was less than 90% likely or
that the near impossible outcome was more than 10% likely, and were not included in the analysis.
3.2.1 Primary Analyses
The mean judgment of the conjunction across all problems was 46.53% (SD = 28.20), and the
mean judgment of the sole event across all problems was 39.35% (SD = 28.78).
As in Experiment 1, we averaged the rating difference scores (δ) for each participant for each
of the eight problems (Figure 3).
Across all three conditions, the average rating difference score was +7.18% (SD = 12.34, SE =
0.92), which was reliably greater than zero, according to a two-tailed one-sample t-test, t(179) =
7.81, p < .001, and a one-sample BEST, 95% Credible Interval: [5.30, 9.00]. The effect size was d
= 0.58, 95% CI: [0.42, 0.74]. Again, participants systematically rated conjunctions as more likely
than a constituent sole event.
The effect of condition on rating difference scores was not significant, F (2, 177) = 0.068, p =
.93, η2= 0.001, and Bayesian analysis found strong evidence of no difference, BF10 = 0.067. We
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dummy coded condition in a linear regression and in a Bayesian linear regression, the Original
condition being used as the reference level, to compare the new phrasings to the Original phrasing.
Neither slope was significantly different from zero, all p’s > .80, all Bayesian 95% credible intervals
for the slopes including zero, indicating no differences between each alternative condition and the
Original condition.
None of the 95% confidence intervals on the slopes indicated differences that would reduce any
condition to zero. Further one-sample t-tests showed consistent differences from zero, p < .001 for
all three conditions, and all Bayesian 95% credible intervals not including zero.
3.2.2 Secondary Analyses
As before, three new coders coded free response reports of strategy according to the system de-
scribed above. The ratings had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.78, indicating acceptable agreement (Kline,
2013).
A Chi-square test found no evidence of a relationship between condition and approach used,
χ2(6, N = 180) = 9.56, p = .14, and a Bayesian test of association produced a Bayes factor of 5:1
against a relationship between condition and approach, suggesting that the different phrasings did
not influence choice of the approach used to solve the problems.
To determine if there was an overall impact of approach, a one-way between subjects ANOVA
was conducted to compare the effect of reported approach on overall ratings on the critical items.
There was no significant effect, F (3, 176) = 0.582, p = .63, η2= 0.01, and a Bayesian test produced
a Bayes factor of 13:1 against a difference by reported approach.
4 Experiment 3
Experiment 2 establishes that the physical conjunction fallacy effect is highly consistent across
alternative phrasings of the critical question, suggesting that the physical scenario itself, rather
than the pragmatics of the question, produces this judgment pattern.
However, Experiments 1 and 2 investigate only one specific instance of the physical conjunction
fallacy (two balls colliding mid-air). One concern is that some unexplored idiosyncrasy of our
original design was responsible for this effect. By exploring whether we find this error in a range of
more and less similar scenes, we round out the evidence for a physical conjunction fallacy. To that
end, in Experiment 3, we designed and tested a range of different physical scenarios which have
varying similarity to those in Experiment 1 and 2.
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4.1 Method
4.1.1 Participants
We collected 198 participants (70 female, mean age = 36.89, SD = 10.66) on Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk. Exclusion criteria were the same as in Experiment 1. We analyzed only the first 100 partic-
ipants (36 female, mean age = 38.34, SD = 10.17), as stated in a new preregistration (here), as
this new experiment was added at the request of reviewers.
4.1.2 Materials and Procedure
We piloted a few different types of physical scenes before settling on three designs to develop
further. These three new types of scenes were developed to investigate how widely the physical
conjunction fallacy appears. As a result, the first new type of scene is somewhat similar to our
original design, the second departs in certain critical ways, and the third is intentionally different
along several axes. All materials are available on the OSF.
The first, “Tubes”, is moderately similar in design to the original scenes (Figure 4a). Like the
scenes used in the previous experiments, “Tubes” scenes involve two balls, both moving. As in our
original scenes, one of the key questions is about whether or not the two balls will collide, and the
other question concerns where one of the balls will end up. This type of scene always involves a
red and a blue ball each exiting a tube, moving in the same direction, and flying towards a bucket,
which they might land in but might equally overshoot. The sole question was always, “How likely
is it that the BLUE ball will end up in the BUCKET?”, and the conjunction question was always,
“How likely is it that the RED ball and the BLUE ball will collide, and the BLUE ball will end up
in the BUCKET?”
The second, “Basket Tube”, represents more of a departure from our original design (Figure
4b). While these scenes also include a possible collision event, there is only ever one moving object,
a single pink ball. This limits the amount of information participants need to keep track of to make
an informed decision. The object in motion and its trajectory will always be the focus of attention,
so different ways of asking the question shouldn’t bring new sets of objects into scrutiny. Each
scene showed the pink ball flying in an arc above a field with a grey tube sticking up out of it.
Each scene paused at a point where the ball clearly would not fall into the tube if continuing on
its parabolic trajectory. However, there was always a blue “backstop” ahead of the ball, which the
ball could possibly hit. If the ball were to hit this backstop, it was possible that it might bounce
off the backstop and into the tube. The sole question was always, “How likely is it that the ball
will end up in the TUBE?”, and the conjunction question was always, “How likely is it that the
ball will hit the BLUE backstop and the ball will end up in the TUBE?”
The final type of new scenes, “Still Weight Tower”, represents the greatest departure from our
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Figure 4: An annotated example of the three new scene types approximately as they appeared
to participants. Dotted arrows indicate approximate direction of motion, if any. All scenes were
in actuality the same dimensions, and are truncated here to conserve space. a) An example of a
“Tubes” scene at the point where the video clip stopped. b) An example of a “Basket Tube” scene
at the point where the video clip stopped. c) An example of a “Still Weight Tower” scene. In this
type of scene, the tower was presented as a still image rather than as a short video clip.
original design, and therefore shows the greatest generalization of the effect (Figure 4c). These
scenes were still images, rather than short videos; they involved no objects with initial motion;
they involved the complex interaction of more than two objects, rather than simple collisions;
and while in all other designs, both components of the conjunction are events, in this case one
of the critical questions was about a parameter (the weight) of a particular object in the scene.
Each scene portrayed a small standing block tower of 5 or 6 blocks. Some blocks were pale, some
were dark, and one block was always bright red. To orient them to the scene, with every such
image participants were told, “the DARK blocks are HEAVY, the PALE blocks are LIGHT, and
the RED blocks might be either HEAVY or LIGHT.” As part of the design, these red blocks of
ambiguous weight were always placed at a location in the tower where the question of their weight
might contribute seriously to the tower’s overall stability. The exact sole and conjunction questions
differed somewhat between the different towers, but the sole question always concerned whether or
not the tower would stay standing, e.g. “How likely is it that the tower will STAY STANDING?”
and the conjunction question always added a question about the weight of the red block, e.g. “How
likely is it that the RED block is HEAVY and the tower will STAY STANDING?”
There were four scenes of each type, for a total of twelve new scenes. Each of these scenes
appeared twice, once with the conjunction question and once with the sole question. Scenes were
intermixed with a small number of filler questions to help prevent recognition of previous questions.
Materials were presented as in the previous experiments. In the main body of the study, all
participants saw both questions for all of the scenes, and estimated the likelihood of the stated
outcome, as in previous experiments.
Finally, participants answered several demographic questions, gave free-response feedback, and
were debriefed.
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4.2 Results
The study included the same two trivially obvious questions as in Experiments 1 and 2. When
answering these questions, 10 participants reported that the near certain outcome was less than
90% likely or that the near impossible outcome was more than 10% likely, and were not included
in the analysis.
4.2.1 Primary Analyses
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we averaged the rating difference scores (δ) for each participant for
each of the four problems in each of the three new problem types. As a result, we ended up with
a δ for each of the new scene types.
Positive values of δ indicate that participants rated conjunctions as more likely than their
constituent sole events, which is a form of the conjunction fallacy.
Tubes The mean judgment of the conjunction across all four scenes of this type was 43.15% (SD
= 19.04), and the mean judgment of the sole event across all four scenes of this type was 33.07%
(SD = 19.00).
The average δ value for the “Tubes” problems was +10.08% (SD = 17.22, SE = 1.72), which
was reliably greater than zero, according to both a two-tailed one-sample t-test, t(99) = 5.85, p <
.001, and a one-sample BEST, 95% Credible Interval: [6.40, 13.00]. The effect size was d = 0.59,
95% CI: [0.37, 0.80].
Basket Tube The mean judgment of the conjunction across all four scenes of this type was
34.73% (SD = 16.10), and the mean judgment of the sole event across all four scenes of this type
was 31.03% (SD = 13.80).
The average δ value for the “Basket Tube” problems was +3.70% (SD = 10.93, SE = 1.09),
which was reliably greater than zero, according to both a two-tailed one-sample t-test, t(99) =
3.39, p = .001, and a one-sample BEST, 95% Credible Interval: [1.60, 5.90]. The effect size was d
= 0.34, 95% CI: [0.14, 0.54].
Still Weight Tower The mean judgment of the conjunction across all four scenes of this type
was 44.77% (SD = 13.34), and the mean judgment of the sole event across all four scenes of this
type was 40.00% (SD = 14.85). This is strong evidence that participants are not misinterpreting
the conjunction as the conditional. Conditional on the red block’s weight being known, the overall
likelihood would be well over 50%, which we don’t observe here.
The average δ value for the “Still Weight Tower” problems was +4.77% (SD = 14.38, SE =
1.44), which was reliably greater than zero, according to both a two-tailed one-sample t-test, t(99)
14
= 3.31, p = .001, and a one-sample BEST, 95% Credible Interval: [1.80, 7.40]. The effect size was
d = 0.33, 95% CI: [0.13, 0.53].
Overall, it appears that there is a reliable tendency to make conjunction fallacy errors in all
three of the new scene types.
5 General Discussion
This paper reports three experiments showing that people rate conjunctive events as more likely
than their constituents across a set of physical reasoning problems. Experiment 1 demonstrated
the effect, Experiment 2 showed that the effect was robust to a range of alternative phrasings, and
Experiment 3 expanded the finding to a wider range of physical scenes.
While the conjunction fallacy is well-established, the detection of a similar effect in physical
reasoning is unexpected for several reasons. Many arguments have been made that intuitive physical
reasoning is distinct from other types of cognitive activities and will be immune to these types of
errors. In addition, common explanations evoked for the conjunction fallacy seem hard to apply
in this case. For example, the concept of “representativeness”, seems less relevant to the physical
domain, as there isn’t such a salient category or schema to activate.
One possibility is that the conjunction fallacy is a general phenomenon that occurs across many
domains because it is an fundamental error in our judgment capacities. However, in followup work
we have found that while magnitudes of conjunction fallacy errors are often correlated with one
another (e.g., the size of an individual’s error on a “Linda” problem correlates with conjunction
fallacy errors on reasoning about dice), physics conjunction errors do not correlate with these other
problems, suggesting a distinct and novel mechanism (Ludwin-Peery, 2020).
We argue that these results are additionally intriguing because they are unexpected given recent
accounts of probabilistic mental simulation. However, such theories might be modified in light of
these results. For example, rather than aggregating across multiple simulation runs in order to
make a probabilistic inference, people might use some type of biased aggregation scheme which
results in judgement errors (Zhu, Sanborn, & Chater, 2020). It remains to be seen if this biased
aggregation approach can provide a simultaneous account of all the other documented phenomena
in intuitive physical reasoning.
Importantly, past work has frequently acknowledged that there might be cases where heuristics
were employed instead of mental simulation (Battaglia et al., 2013). If simulation is abandoned
for certain problems, it suggests a control problem for the brain to determine when to adopt a
simulation and when to use a heuristic. The present experiments provide an important waypoint
about when simulation might be abandoned that may help inform such theories.
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